NOTES
PROSPECTUS LIABILITY AND RULE 10b-5: A
SEQUEL TO BAR CHRIS
The judicial task of integrating the various federal provisions
regulating securities transactions has nowhere proved more

troublesome than in the courts' attempts to harmonize the express
civil liability provisions of the Securities Act of 19331 with the private

right of action available under rule lOb-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.2 The rule, which applies to both purchases
and sales, was designed primarily to provide the government with the
same criminal and injunctive sanctions against fraudulent purchases
of undervalued securities that section 17 of the 1933 Act" had provided
1. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1964) [hereinafter cited as the
1933 Act]. Section II imposes civil liability on issuers of registered securities when the
registration statement is misleading. Section 12(1) imposes liability on anyone who offers or
sells a security in violation of section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964), which generally prohibits the
offering or selling of unregistered securities, subject to the exceptions listed in section 3(a), 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1964). Section 12(2) imposes liability on anyone who offers or sells either a
registered or an unregistered security, other than a government or bank security, by means of a
prospectus or oral communication containing a material misstatement. See 3 L. Loss,
SECURIES REGULATION 1684 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. For the text of section 12(2),
see note 6 infra. In addition, section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964), imposes liability on anyone
who "controls" a person liable under sections II or 12. See note 59 infra and accompanying
text.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970). The text of rule l0b-5 is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce~or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
The rule was promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1964) [hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act], which states in pertinent part that:
It shall be unlawful for any person.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe. . ..
3. Securities Act of 1933, § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964).
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in cases involving the fraudulent sale of overvalued securities. 4 The

courts, however, found that the rule also provided the defrauded seller
with a private remedy 5 corresponding with the remedy expressly
provided a defrauded buyer by section 12(2) of the 1933 Act.' This
would seem, in turn, to place the defrauded buyer at a disadvantage
since the implied civil remedy of the defrauded seller is unencumbered
by the many procedural restrictions of section 12(2).7 Thus, rule lOb-5
4. The language of section 17 of the 1933 Act is practically identical with that of rule lOb-5,
except that it applies to sellers only.
The announced purpose of rule lOb-5 was to prohibit "individuals or companies from
buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase." SEC Securities Act Release No.
3230 (May 21, 1942), reprintedin A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE l0b-5,
Appendix B, at 295 [hereinafter cited as BROMBERGJ. The rule allowed the Commission to reach
corporate insiders who were fraudulently purchasing securities on the basis of inside information
for personal orcorporate gain. Professor Bromberg suggests that the promulgation of the rule in
1942 was prompted by an upswing in the economy, which stimulated fraudulent purchases.
BROMBERG § 2.2, at 20. Use of the rule-making power followed an unsuccessful attempt by the
Commission to have section 17 of the 1933 Act amended so as to cover purchases as well as
sales. 3 Loss 1426-27.
5. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), was the landmark
decision and has been widely followed. See, q.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282
F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Fratt v.
Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 649 (1954). But see Ruder, Civil
Liability Under Rule lOb-5:JudicialRevision of LegislativeIntent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 627, 633
(1963).
The two bases found for implied civil liability under the rule are: A statutory basis in section
29 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1964), which declares contracts entered into in violation
of any provision of the Act or any rule thereunder to be void as to that person violating such
provision and thus implies the right to bring suit to have a contract so declared, see, e.g., Fratt v.
Robinson, supra; and the common-law tort doctrine that a person injured by violation of a
statute enacted for persons in his position is entitled to recover damages. See, e.g., Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., supra; W. PROSSER, TORTS § 35, at 195-205 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]. See generallyBROMBERG §§ 2A(l)(a)-(b), at 28-32.
6. 1933 Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964). The section states, in pertinent part, that:
Any person who(2) offers or sells a security [other than a government or bank security] . . . by
means of a prospectus or oral communication which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
.. . not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who
shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission,
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law
or in equity. ...
7. Section 13 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964), requires that actions under sections
11 and 12(2) be brought within one year after the inaccuracy in the registration statement or
prospectus was or should have been discovered. Rule lob-5 actions are governed by generally
longer state statutes of limitations. BROMIBERO § 2.5(1), at 41. Section I1 (e) of the 1933 Act, 15
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has been construed by a number of courts so as to provide a private
remedy for defrauded buyers as well as sellers. Early decisions simply
assumed that a buyer as well as a seller had an implied right of action
and never considered how that assumption affected the vitality of the
buyer's express remedy under section 12(2).8 Even in more recent
cases, where the possible effect on section 12(2) was considered, the
courts have, for the most part, followed these early decisions and
allowed a buyer to bring a rule lOb-5 action. 9 Presently at issue is
whether rule lOb-5 and section 12(2) are to be distinguished on the
basis of the theory of tort liability underlying each.10 One line of
U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964), provides that plaintiffs in a section I1 or section 12 action may be
required to post security for expenses. The 1934 Act has no such provision applying to rule lOb5. Finally, the venue provision in section 22(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1964), is
more restrictive than that in section 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
Both section 11 and section 12(2) provide certain defenses. See notes 29-35 infra and
accompanying text. In a procedural sense, however, the defenses simply shift the burden of proof
as to the elements of scienter and negligence to the defendant, and are thus not "restrictions.'
The defenses are restrictive in that, without them, sections IIand 12(2) would dispense with the
elements of scienter and negligence altogether. In this regard, the defenses are not procedural but
substantive restrictions. Failure to distinguish the procedural and substantive restrictions of the
express provisions of the 1933 Act has led to considerable confusion in rule lOb-5 case law. See
notes 16 &44 infra.
8.See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Osborne v. Mallory,
86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F.
Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949). Contra, Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.
Pa. 1948); Montague v. Electronics Corp., 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
Fischman has been criticized for ignoring section 12(2) in favor of rule l0b-5, even though
section 12(2) was equally available to the plaintiff (buyer) in that case. See, e.g., Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757,765 (1964). In some situations, however, a buyer is
altogether precluded from bringing either a section II or a section 12(2) action. See notes 37-41
infra and accompanying text.
Rosenberg and Montague, the principal cases denying buyers a rule 10b-5 remedy, are
discussed in notes 42-44 infra. For a general discussion of the question whether a rule lob-5
action can be brought when the claim could also be brought under the express provisions of the
1933 Act, see note 48 infra.
9. See, e.g., Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968);
Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210
(9th Cir. 1962); Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co.
v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Miller v.
Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Dauphin v. Redwall Corp., 201 F.
Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962). The propriety of the rule lOb-5 private remedy was questioned in
Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. I11.
1967), and Weber v. C.M.P. Corp.,
242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), but a buyer's action was nevertheless allowed.
10. Professor Prosser lists the grounds for imposing tort liability under three headings:
Intentional conduct, negligence, and strict-or "no fault"-liability. PROSSER § 6, at 27. The
same division is adopted in RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTs (1965) (table of contents). Under
sections IIand 12(2) of the 1933 Act, plaintiff is required to prove only that defendant made an
untrue statement or material omission in a registration statement or prospectus. Under section
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cases" emphasizes that rule lOb-5, as an antifraud provision, should
be read to require a showing of scienter.' 2 Thus, whereas section 12(2)
of the 1933 Act reaches negligent as well as intentional misconduct,"3
a rule lOb-5 action would be restricted to cases of intentional
misconduct. Not to make such a distinction, it is argued, would be to
deny effect to the congressionally intended procedural restrictions of
section 12(2).14 A second line of cases'5 has dispensed with the element
11, the issuing corporation is strictly liable unless plaintiff knew that the statement was
inaccurate, but all other defendants are permitted defenses limiting their liability to knowing or
negligent conduct. Section 12(2) permits a similar defense. See text accompanying notes 28 &33
infra. Considerable confusion exists as to which grounds underlie rule lOb-5 liability. See notes
12, 16 & 17 infra and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 770 (D. Colo. 1964); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F.
Supp. 416,419 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also 3 Loss 1766.
12. This distinction was suggested in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951), in which the court stated that when the ingredient of fraud is added to conduct actionable
under the 1933 Act, "that conduct becomes actionable under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and the
Rule. . .whether or not [one] could maintain a suit under § I1 of the 1933 Act." Id. at 787.
Though Fischman is specifically concerned with section 11 of the 1933 Act, its reasoning applies
to the distinction between rule lOb-5 and section 12(2) as well.
(2) a material;
The common-law elements of fraud or deceit are: (1)A false representation of;
(3) fact; (4) known by the defendant to be false but made for the purpose ofinducing the plaintiff
to rely on it, on which; (5) the plaintiff does justifiably rely; (6) to his detriment. 3 Loss 1431.
The term :scienter," with reference to the fourth element, is defined by some as "knowledge
of the falsity of a representation"; by others as "intent to mislead." Compare3 Loss 1431 with
PROSSER § 102, at 715.
The term "fraud" is afflicted with a similar ambiguity stemming from the fact that, while in
its common-law sense "fraud" connoted all six of the elements above, including specific intent
to defraud, Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889), the term "has a broader meaning in equity
. ..and intention to defraud or to misrepresent is not a necessary element." SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963), quoting W. Ds FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF

MODERN EQUITY 235 (2d ed. 1956). Under the fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts;not
only is the element of scienter being stripped of its common-law meaning, see Trussell v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 772 (D. Colo. 1964) (suggesting that "some element of
scienter,albeit attenuated from common law deceit," be read into rule IOb-5(2)), but also the
concept of fraud is being stripped of the element ofscienter, both in actions for damages as well
as in equitable proceedings. See note 17 infra.Thus, when a court deciding a securities case uses
the term "fraud," it is not always clear whether a requirement of scienter is intended, see note 45
infra, or, if it is intended, which definition of scienter is meant. See, for example, text
accompanying notes 71-73 infra. At least one court has been accused of having "apparently used
[the term 'defraud'] in its 'modern' scientific sense of 'do something bad to."' R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 961 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter

cited as JENNINGS & MARSH].
13. For the text ofsection 12(2) see note 6 supra.
14. See, e.g., Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 770 (D. Colo. 1964).
15. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 312
F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Wellington Computer
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of scienter in rule lOb-5 actions, emphasizing that the language of the
rule, no less than the language of section 12(2), seems to cover
negligent as well as intentional conduct.

16

It is more important,

according to this line of cases, to equalize as nearly as possible the
remedies available to defrauded sellers and buyers than it is to "save"
an express liability provision which would possibly retain its vitality
even if a showing of scienter were no longer required in a rule lOb-5
action.17
Graphics, Inc. v. Modell, 315 F. Supp. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kohler v. Kohler, 208 F. Supp. 808
(E.D. Wis. 1962), affd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
16. See note 2 suprafor the text of rule lOb-5. The literal language of at least the second and
third clauses of the rule, it is argued, does not require a showing of actual fraud, but only a
misstatement, material omission, or conduct which would operate as a fraud. The second clause,
moreover, forbids misleading statements and omissions "in language almost identical to that of
sections II and 12(2)." Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the FederalSecuritiesActs: the BarChris
Case, PartI-the Broader Implications,55 VA. L. Rnv. 199, 238 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Folk, Part III. The difficulty with arguing from the literal language alone, however, is that the
language of the second clause does not seem to require a showing of negligence either. The
similar language in sections II and 12(2) is limited by the defenses which are made available, see
note 10 supra, but those defenses have no counterpart in rule lOb-5. The tripartite division of the
rule seems to suggest a correlation with all three bases for imposing tort liability mentioned in
note 10 supra. See Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. CHI. L.
REv. 824, 825-26 (1965). It has been suggested, however, that the failure to read into the second
clause a requirement that the plaintiff prove negligence would go too far, in that rule Iob-5
would then preempt not just the procedural restrictions of section 12(2), but the express liability
provisions of the 1933 Act as a whole. Folk, Part 1 243 n.157. At least one authority ha
interpreted Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), and its companion cases as having done
just that. See JENNINGS &MARSH 867-68. But see Note, ProofofScienterNecessaryin a Private
Suit Under SEC Anti-FraudRule lob-5, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1070, 1077 (1965), in which it is
suggested that the Elliscourt meant only that actual knowledge need not be proved, leaving open
the possibility of a requirement that plaintiff prove defendant's negligent lack of knowledge.
Actually, Ellis can be read either way, for when it chooses to permit buyers and sellers to sue
under rule lob-5 without distinction and without being subject to the "restrictions" of the
express provisions of the 1933 Act, it uses the term "restriction" ambiguously. If the court was
merely referring to the procedural restrictions enumerated in note 7 supra, then Ellis
undoubtedly follows the weight of authority, since few courts have subjected buyers to the
procedural restrictions of the 1933 Act. If, on the other hand, the court in Ellis meant to free rule
lob-5 of the substantive elements of scienter and negligence, both of which, as was pointed out in
note 7 supra, are retained in the 1933 Act as alternative bases of liability, then Ellis clearly goes
too far, since it is not yet even agreed that an action sounding in negligence can be maintained
under rule l0b-5.
17. Professor Folk remarks that the "alarums sounded over rule lOb-5's tendency to
swallow up all the express civil liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts are exaggerated
and seem rather carping. . . ." Folk, Part11244. He advocates that a compromise be reached
between the extreme of requiring a showing of scienter, see note 11 supra and accompanying
text, and that of requiring only a showing of a misstatement or omission, see note 16 supra, by
judicially importing a negligence standard into rule 1Ob-5(2) and by placing the burden of
proving negligence on the plaintiff. Folk, Part 1 243-44. See generally Mann, Rule lOb-5:
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Regardless of the view which eventually prevails, 8 two problems
of construction will continue to confront the courts, one or both of
which could survive the resolution of the controversy over the basis of
tort liability under rule lOb-5. First, the courts must continue to
grapple with the elusive element of scienter, as well as with the broader
concept of fraud, of which scienter is but a part. 9 Although scienter
may no longer be a necessary condition for imposing rule lOb-5
liability, it will nevertheless remain a sufficient condition for imposing
liability under the rule. 20 Second, assuming the continued vitality of
the rule lOb-5 action for negligence, the courts must spell out the
nature of the duty imposed by the rule, the parties on whom the duty
is imposed and to whom it is owed, and the extent to which rule 1Ob-5
Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrasesof NegligenceandScienter,
45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1206 (1970). Section 12(2) and rule lOb-5 would thus be distinguishable as to
the party bearing the burden of proof on the question of negligence, and a defrauded buyer
would simply have two remedies: one which relieved him of the burden of proving negligence but
which was subject to all of the procedural restrictions enumerated in note 7 supra; the other in
which he bore the burden of proving negligence but was unencumbered by procedural
restrictions.
Such an approach was foreshadowed in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), a suit to obtain injunctive relief under rule lOb5, in which the court said that it was only necessary for the SEC to show "lack of diligence,
constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct." A similar approach was taken in
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967), a suit for injunctive
relief brought by a private party, but the court cited as authority SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), which merely held that "[ilt is not necessary in a suit for
equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary
damages." Id. at 193. However, in Wellington Computer Graphics, Inc. v. Modell, 315 F. Supp.
24, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the district court indicated that the Texas Gulf Sulphur language was
applicable in an action for damages as well. See also note 99 infra and accompanying text.
18. Bromberg remarks that the trend is "very much against" requiring proof of scienter in
rule lOb-5 actions. BROMBERG § 2.6(l) at 50. While this "trend" has been said to be largely in
the eye of the beholder, JENNINGS & MARSH 866 n.6, Folk's willingness to assume that
negligence will eventually be equated with "fraud" under rule lob-5, see Folk, Part I 243,
indicates more than one beholder in whose eye the trend appears. Undoubtedly thejudicialtrend
is in the direction pointed by Bromberg and Folk. The judiciary, however, might be preempted
by legislative re-examination of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, as was called for by the courts
themselves in Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. I ), and in Drake v. Thor Power
Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94,98 (N.D. III. 1967). See also Cohen, Truth in SecuritiesRevisited, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1340 (1966); Henkel, Codification-CivilLiability Under the FederalSecurities
Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 866, 871 (1967); Sommer, Rule lOb-5: Notesfor Legislation, 17 CAsE W.
RES. L. REv. 1029 (1966).
19. See note 12supra.
20. Although in many situations negligence can be established more easily than fraudulent
intent, situations might arise in which the reverse is true. For example, when a defendant has
gone through all the motions of exercising due care in the making of a statement but can be
shown to have done so with foreknowledge that the statement will nevertheless be misleading, it
might be impossible to establish negligence even though defendant's intent to defraud is clear.
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liability is to be distinguished in each of these respects from liability
under the express provisions of the 1933 Act.
21
In light of the holding in Escott v. BarChrisConstructionCorp.,

the latter question takes on particular urgency with respect to
potential rule 10b-5 liability for misrepresentations in a prospectus.
BarChrisdelineated for the first time the standard of care for persons
who are expressly subject to liability under section 11 of the 1933
Act22 and are desirous of taking advantage of the "due diligence"
defenses provided by that section.2 Section 11, of course, is to be
distinguished from section 12(2) in that the former grants a right of
action for misstatements or omissions in a registration statement,
rather than for misstatements or omissions in a prospectus. 24 And, as
earlier discussed, it was section 12(2)'s grant of a right of action to a
purchaser, not section I I's, that originally stimulated the courts to
grant the seller a private right of action under rule 1Ob-5. 2 Yet,
because the prospectus of a registered issue is a required part of the
registration statement,26 considerable overlap in the coverage of the
two sections of the 1933 Act exists.27 Further, with both sections
21. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
22. For the persons liable under section 11, see text accompanying note 32 infra.
23. Section I1(b) provides all section II defendants except the issuing corporation
itself-whose only defense under section 1 (a) is that plaintiff knew the registration statement
was false-with certain defenses of non-involvement, non-negligence, and lack of scienter.
BarChriswas chiefly concerned with the latter two defenses, which are spoken of as section I I's
"due diligence" defenses. For a discussion of the specific defenses, see notes 29-32 infra and
accompanying text. In addition to its function as a label for these specific defenses, the term
"due diligence" has a generic meaning as well. While courts have generally agreed that "due
diligence" and "due care" are practically synonymous, see, e.g., Hendricks v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 126 N.C. 304, 312, 35 S.E. 543, 546 (1900); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Smith, 133
S.W. 1062, 1064 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), it is analytically useful to distinguish them. "Due care"
can be said to be a standard of care for the carrying out of a voluntary act. One may omit doing
the act, but if one chooses to act, one must act with due care. "Due diligence," on the other
hand, connotes an affirmative duty to perform an act as well as to perform it carefully. Of
course, "due care" in a generally voluntary course of conduct might entail specific duties of due
diligence. Nevertheless, the two terms have different shadings of meaning and will be
distinguished hereafter in this note. See, for example, note 34 infra and accompanying text.
24. See note I supra.
25. See text accompanying notes 5 & 6 supra.
26. The 1933 Act does not itself expressly state that the prospectus is a required part of the
registration statement, but section 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a) (1964), defines the information which
must be contained in a prospectus by reference to the schedule of information required in a
registration statement. See also SEC Reg. C, 17 C.F.R. § 230A04(a) (1970), which states, in
part, that "a copy of the proposed prospectus may be filed as a part of the registration statement
proper in lieu of furnishing the information in item-and-answer form."
27. See Folk, Part II 201. The most important difference between the two sections,
according to Folk, is the strict privity requirement of section 12(2), which permits a buyer to sue
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allowing for affirmative defenses in language sufficiently similar to
connote a congressional intent that the standard of diligence should be
the same in both sections, 2 the delineation in BarChris of such a
standard for persons subject to liability under section 11 could
reasonably be said to have defined the standard of diligence for those
subject to liability under section 12(2) as well.
The most important due diligence defense considered in BarChris
concerns the "non-expertized" portions of the registration
statement, 29 as to which the section 11 defendant must show that he
mad& a "reasonable investigation" 30 of the statements contained
therein and that, as a result of such investigation, he had reasonable
grounds to believe and did believe that the registration statement was

true and that no material fact had been omitted. 3 The duty of
reasonable investigation is imposed on directors of the issuing
corporation, other signers of the registration statement, and
underwriters of the issue, and is owed to anyone who acquires the
security being registered. 32 It is this section 11 duty to which section
12(2)'s duty to exercise reasonable care in the sale of a security by
means of a prospectus or oral communication is most analogous.?
Even though a section 12(2) defendant does not have an explicit
statutory obligation to make a reasonable investigation of the sort
only his immediate seller. Section II has no such requirement, but is restricted, on the other
hand, to purchasers of registered securities, whereas section 12(2) is available to the purchaser of
any security, whether registered or not. Rule lOb-5 is closer to section II on the matter of
privity. See note 38 infra.
28. See Folk, PartH 207-16.
29. Non-expertized portions are those portions of the registration statement "not
purporting to be made on the authority of an expert, and not purporting to be a copy of or
extract from a report or valuation of an expert, and not purporting to be made on the authority
of a public official ... ." 1933 Act § 1l(a)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1964).
30. The standard of reasonableness is defined as "that required of a prudent man in the
management of his own property." Id. § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1964). The most important
feature of BarChris's delineation of what constitutes a "reasonable investigation" was its
requirement that a potential section II defendant verify information provided by the issuing
corporation.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1964). The other due diligence defenses provided by section
I I(b)(3) are concerned with: those "expertized" parts of the registration statement purporting
to be made on the defendant's authority as an expert, as to which defendant's duty of care is
much the same as it is for "non-expertized" portions of the statement; and those "expertized"
parts purporting to be made on the authority of someone else as to which defendant only need
show that there was no reasonable ground to believe, and he did not believe, that that part of the
statement was false.
32. 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964).
33. See Folk, Part//207-16.
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required by section 11, an exercise of reasonable care under section
12(2) might sometimes entail such an investigation, 4 including, in
rare circumstances, a duty of verification of the kind which BarChris
required of section 11 defendants. 35 Thus, the problem of reconciling
the same as that of
rule 10b-5 with section 11 is "essentially
3
reconciling it with section 12(2)." 1
The effect of BarChrison rule 10b-5 prospectus liability depends,
as a practical matter, on whether rule 10b-5 provides any significant
protection against negligent misstatements or omissions in a
prospectus beyond that afforded by the express provisions of the 1933
Act. However, as of 1968, the year BarChriswas decided, rule lOb-5
claims for damages based on a misleading prospectus had been
allowed to stand in only two cases, both of which involved defendants
who were alleged to have had a specific intent to defraud. In Fischman
v. Raytheon ManufacturingCo.37 a claim was allowed under rule lOb5 where holders of unregistered common stock had been fraudulently
induced to purchase by means of a misleading prospectus and
registration statement for a simultaneous issue of registered preferred
stock, but were unable to bring a section 11 action because they were
not purchasers of the security described in the prospectus.e In Thiele
v. Shields 9 a claim was allowed under rule 10b-5 where a purchaser of
municipal bonds was misled by an offering circular used in connection
with an allegedly fraudulent scheme to sell the bonds. The purchaser
was unable to state a claim under either of the express provisions of
34. Id. at 213. This is an illustration of how a duty of due care in a voluntary, general course
of conduct might entail specific duties of diligence. See note 23 supra.
35. Folk, Part 11213.
36. JENNINGS & MARSH 868.

37. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
38. On section I l's limitation to purchasers of registered securities, see notes I &27 supra.
For the criticism that Fischman failed to consider the applicability of section 12(2), see note 8
supra.
Section 12(2) requires privity between plaintiff and defendant. See note 27 supra. Because
privity is not an element of common-law fraud, see note 12 supra, rule lOb-5 is not thought to
require such a showing, see Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 249 (6th
Cir. 1962); BROMBERG § 8.5, at 205-08; Comment, Civil Liability UnderSection J0b and Rule
lOb-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 659, 663 (1965),"
although one early opinion, no longer considered valid precedent, ruled to the contrary. See
Joseph v. Farnesworth Radio &Telev. Corp., 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). Thus, had plaintiffs
in Fischman purchased common stock through an intermediate vendor, relying on the
registration statement of the registered preferred stock, they could have maintained neither a
section II nor a section 12(2) action.
39. 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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the 1933 Act because issuers of municipal bonds are neither required
to register them40 nor subject to liability under section 12(2)." In two
earlier cases,42 in which plaintiffs' claims were actionable under
section 11, but were brought under rule lOb-5 in order to avoid the
procedural restrictions of the express liability provision,43 the rule
1Ob.5 cause of action was either disallowed or subjected to the
procedural restrictions of section 1I.1 At least two later cases
involving a misleading prospectus have reiterated that in order to
maintain an action under rule lOb-5, plaintiff must allege and prove
45
fraudulent conduct.
40. Municipal lionds are one of the securities exempted from the registration requirements
of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1964).
41. Section 12(2) specifically exempts from liability issuers of those securities exempted
from registration by section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act. See note 40 supra.
42. Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Montague v.
Electronics Corp., 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
43. In Montague plaintiff was attempting to avoid the security-for-expenses provisions of
section 11. In Rosenberg plaintiff was attempting to avoid section I I's restrictive venue
provisions. See note 7 supra.
44. The court in Montague specifically disallowed the rule lOb-5 claim; the court in
Rosenberg, without deciding whether a rule lob-5 claim was stated, held that in any event the
venue provisions of sections II and 12(2) governed the action exclusively. This is one of the few
examples of a court's having subjected the buyer under rule lob-5 to the procedural restrictions
of the 1933 Act. It does not necessarily follow, however, as Jennings and Marsh maintain, that
because Rosenbergwould subject the buyer to the proceduralrestrictions of sections I I and 12
enumerated in note 7 supra, his rule lOb-5 action would be subject to "all of the defenses and
qualifications of a suit under Section 11 (which is the same thing as saying that it can't be
maintained at all)." JENNINGS & MARCH 868 (emphasis added). To be sure, ir quite apart from
Rosenberg, a negligence standard were to be read into lOb-5(2), Rosenberg's addition of the
procedural restrictions of the 1933 Act would do away with the rule lob-5 remedy. Rosenberg
itself, however, cannot be cited as authority for the proposition that the substantive elements
contained in section Il's due diligence defenses are to be read into rule lOb-5, since Rosenberg
merely imposed section Il's procedural restrictions. For the effect of Fischman on Rosenberg
and Montague, see note 48 infra.
45. Gould v. Tricon, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 385, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Brunswick Corp., 257 F. Supp. 875, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (dictum). In Gould plaintiff's claims
under section 12(2) were allowed to stand, but his rule l0b-5 claims were dismissed because
fraud was not alleged. In ColonialRealty plaintiff was unable to state a claim under section I I
because he was not a "purchaser" within the meaning of that section, but the court did indicate
that he might have a cause of action under rule l0b-5, if."fraud" could be shown. Predictably,
each case seems to attach a different meaning to "fraud." Gouldapparently assumes a showing
of scienter is required, while ColonialRealty follows SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. 180 (1963), which dispenses with the element of scienter in equitable proceedings. See
note 17 supra. This can be explained by the fact that Gould is an action for damages, while
Colonial Realty could be said to be suggesting that plaintiff bring an equitable action.
Confusion results, however, because Gould cites Colonial Really as authority for the
proposition that proof of fraud is required in a rule lob-5 action. For a general discussion of
"fraud," see note 12supra.
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960),
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The paucity of early rule IOb-5 cases.involving misstatements or
omissions in a selling device such as a prospectus can be explained in
part by the once-held view that the sole protection afforded by rule
lOb-5 was against the misrepresentations of a buyer46 and in part by
the early proscription against applying rule lOb-5 when express
provisions of the 1933 Act are also applicable.47 But even after
Fischman apparently eliminated both of these obstacles" few rule

lOb-5 cases involving a prospectus were litigated. This curious inertia
in an otherwise burgeoning period in rule 10b-5's development as a
civil remedy for investors was undoubtedly due to the notion spawned
in Fischman that rule lOb-5 reached only intentional conduct. As to
rev'd on fact issue sub nona. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir.
1962), which held that a plaintiff purchaser "need only prove that a statement in a prospectus or
oral communication is in fact false," 187 F. Supp. at 23, is distinguishable-plaintiff only
sought equitable relief, see notes 12 & 17 supra-and based on dubious authority. The court
cited two cases in support of its holding: Thiele, which, of course, stands for just the opposite
proposition, and Ouachita Indus., Inc. v. Willingham, 179 F. Supp. 493 (W.D. Ark. 1959),
which is a section 12(2), rather than a rule lOb-5 action. The court of appeals, while reversing on
other grounds, suggests that intent to defraud is material and was proven in this case. 307 F.2d
at 249.
46. Obviously, a buyer is unlikely to have made his misrepresentations in a selling device.
47. Both the proscription against applying rule lOb-5 when an express provision of the 1933
Act is also applicable and the limitation of rule lOb-5 as a seller's remedy are ultimately
traceable to Montague v. Electronic Corp., 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See note 48 infra.
48. Largely because of Fischman, it has been said of Montague and Rosenberg that they
"cannot longer be regarded as valid," at least insofar as they hold that a buyer is altogether
barred from bringing an action under rule l0b-5. BROMBERG § 2A(2), at 34 n.76. Montague.
however, also stands for the more limited principle that a buyer's claim under rule lOb-5 will be
dismissed when it could also be stated under one of the express provisions of the 1933 Act.
Technically, the holding in Fischman left this principle intact with respect to section II of the
1933 Act, since the rule lob-5 plaintiff in Fischman could not bring an action under section II.
See note 38 supra and accompanying text. But by overlooking section 12(2)'s applicability, see
note 8 supra, Fischman seemed to invalidate the Montagueprinciple as applied to section 12(2).
Moreover, in dictum at least, the court in Fischman rejected the Montague principle even as
applied to section 11. 188 F.2d at 787. See note 12 supra.See also Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F.
Supp. 869, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), where it is stated that "[cloncurrent remedies under several
sections of both Acts may be available to the investor injured by the seller's fraudulent
practices."
The court in Jordon Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 282 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill.
1967), attempted to revive the broader implication of Montague that a buyer cannot maintain
an action under rule lOb-5, but Jordon was reversed on appeal. 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968). At
least two recent cases have adhered to the more limited Montague principle that conflicts
between the express provisions of the 1933 Act and the implied private remedy under rule lob-5
should be resolved in favor of the Act. See Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 355 (10th Cir. 1970);
Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 99-102 (N.D. Ill. 1967). However, both cases
were concerned with section 12(2). The Fischmandictum quoted in note 12 suprahas never been
explicitly rejected by later courts.
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that kind of conduct, the registration and civil liability provisions of
the 1933 Act apparently were having such a prophylactic effect that
even section 11 was seldom invoked to reach it.' 9 Nevertheless,
Fischman and Thiele demonstrate that rule 1Ob-5 provides significant
protection beyond that provided by the express provisions of the 1933
Act.against misstatements or omissions in a prospectus-namely in
cases involving the fraudulent sale of government or bank securities or
the fraudulent use of a prospectus to induce the purchase or sale of a
security other than the one described in the prospectus. The emergence
of a*rule lOb-5 right of action for merely negligent-perhaps even
merely inadvertent-misstatements or omissions,"0 together with the
delineation in BarChris of the duty of diligence owed in the
preparation of a prospectus, presages the possible extension of rule
lOb-5 into the formerly neglected area of prospectus liability. The
degree to which this extension will occur depends on the extent to
which the duty of diligence owed under section I I of the 1933 Act is
found to be owed under rule lOb-5 as well.
Two provisions in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
provide a possible basis for distinguishing the duties imposed by
section 11 and rule lOb-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,5 ' which is the
immediate source of the Commission's power to promulgate rule 1Ob5, makes it unlawful to use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security, any manipulative or deceptive device in
contravention of such rules as the Commission might prescribe. 2
Since rule lOb-5 can only implement and not add to section 10(b), 3 it
might be argued that to hold a signer of a prospectus liable under rule
lOb-5, the plaintiff must prove not only that the prospectus contained
a misstatement or omission, as is sufficient for liability under section
49. Professor Loss remarked in 1961 that, while at the time it was passed, section II was
considered to be the "bete noir which was going to stifle legitimate financing," it had actually
produced only two reported recoveries in 28 years. 3 Loss 1721. The delineation in BarChris of
the duty of diligence owed under section I I has revived much of the original foreboding as to
section Il's effect on the securities industry. See generally Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the
FederalSecuritiesActs: the BarChris Case, Partl,55 VA. L. REv. 1,3-4 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Folk, PartI].
50. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
52. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
52. For the text ofsection 10(b) of the 1934 Act, see note 2 supra.
53. Cf.3 Loss 1765; Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 649 (1954).
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11 of the 1933 Act,e. but also that the signer was actually involved in

using the prospectus "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a
security. 5 The only exception to the requirement of actual
involvement is that of section 20(a) of the 1934 Act,56 under which a
person "controlling ' 57 a violator of section 10(b) or the rules
promulgated thereunder would be jointly liable with such controlled

person unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not,
directly or indirectly, induce the "act or acts constituting the violation
or cause of action." s Under the analogous provision of the 1933
Act, 59 which applies to persons controlling a violator of section 11 or
12 of that act, the controlling person can avoid liability only by
showing both that he had no actual knowledge and that he had no
reasonable ground to believe that the prospectus or registration

statement contained misstatements or omissions. Thus, a controlling
person under the 1933 Act, like the person controlled, is under a duty

to act reasonably on the basis of what he knows or could have known
about the prospectus or registration statement, regardless whether he
had any connection with its drafting or use. The liability of a

controlling person under the 1934 Act, on the other hand, would
appear to depend either on an inference of actual knowledge from
which a further inference of a lack of good faith can be drawn, or on
evidence that the controlling person directly or indirectly induced the
employment of the misleading prospectus or registration statement.
54. See text accompanying notes 29-32.supra. Such a showing would also be sufficient under
rule lOb-5(2), reading the clause literally. For the text of lOb-5(2), see note 2 supra. Rule lOb5(2)'s similarity to sections I1 and 12(2) is pointed out in note 16 supra.
55. Similarly, the language of the first and third clauses of the rule itself suggests a "use"
requirement. See note 2 supra. A distinction between making a statement and using it
deceptively is only meaningful with respect to a prospectus or other non-personal written
documents, since in oral or written personal communications the "making" and the "use"
occur simultaneously. That this distinction has not been pointed out before is perhaps explained
by the paucity of rule lOb-5 cases dealing with a misleading prospectus. See text following note
36 supra. For the current interpretation of the phrase "in connection with," see note 86 infra.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1964).
57. For a discussion of what constitutes "control," see note 100 infra and accompanying
text.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1964). Because the controlling person must show non-inducement
of the "acts constituting a violation or cause of action," his defense in a rule lOb-5 action
depends on a prior determination of what constitutes a rule lOb-5 cause of action. Thus, by
itself, section 20 adds little meaning to the language of section 10(b) or rule l0b-5. The section is
of service in distinguishing rule lOb-5 and section 11 of the 1933 Act, however, as the
comparison in the text following this note between its language and the language of the
"controlling person" provision of the 1933 Act indicates.
59. Section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
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Beyond these bare suggestions as to the difference between the duty
imposed by rule lOb-5 and that imposed by section Il of the 1933
Act, however, the 1934 Act is silent. Thus, just as the availability of a
rule lOb-5 action itself depended on judicial inference, so the precise
nature of the duty imposed by the rule, including an indication of the
parties on whom the duty is imposed and those to whom it is owed,
would seem to depend on judicial determination.
The recently decided case of Lanza v. Drexel & Co.6" provides a
unique opportunity for a post-BarChriscomparison between the duty
imposed by section 11 of the 1933 Act, and that imposed by rule lOb5 for misstatements or omissions in a prospectus. Lanza is a rule lOb5 case involving the same prospectus and many of the same
defendants as were involved in BarChris. During the latter stages of
what the court described as the "metoric growth and demise"" t of
BarChris Construction Company, the officers of the corporation had
arranged for the sale of debentures in order to alleviate an increasingly
tight cash situation. The prospectus prepared in connection with the
debenture issue contained misstatements and omissions which became
the basis of the section 11 liability in BarChris.This same prospectus
was given to representatives of Victor Billiard Company during
negotiations leading to an exchange of common stock by which
BarChris gained control of Victor Billiard. After purchasers of the
debentures brought their section 11 action, BarChris promptly went
into bankruptcy. The officers of Victor Billiard regained control of
their company's stock at considerable expense to themselves and
sought by way of various theories of tort liability to recover damages
against the lead underwriter of the debentures issue62 and certain
former directors of BarChris Corporation. Five of the directors
named as defendants in Lanza had signed the prospectus and
consequently had been held liable in BarChrisunder section 11 of the
60. CCH FED. SEc. L. REp.

92,826 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

61. Id. at 90,091.
62. The lead underwriter was Drexel & Company. Drexel was sued on grounds of respondeat

superior,due to the position of its attorney and one of its members as directors of BarChris
Construction Corporation. See note 63 infra and text accompanying note 67 infra. As lead
underwriter of the debentures issue, Drexel was, of course, directly liable in BarChris under
section 11. 283 F. Supp. at 692. See also Comment, The Expanding Liability of Securities
Underwriters:from BarChris to Globus, 1969 Dunn L.J. 1191. The plaintiffs' omission of

Drexel & Company as a rule lOb-5 defendant in Lanza indicates the plaintiffs' doubts that an
underwriter could, in normal circumstances, be considered to have "made" the misleading
statements in the prospectus or to have "employed" it deceptively for purposes of rule 1Ob-5,
even though it may have failed to make a section 11 reasonable investigation.
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1933 Act.0 It was against these five signers of the prospectus that

Victor Billiard's officers made their rule lOb-5 claims. Of thl five
signers, only Kircher, the treasurer and chief financial officer, was
actively involved in presenting the misleading prospectus to the
negotiators for Victor Billiard.64 Of the three remaining inside
directors, Russo, a vice-president and chief executive officer of the
corporation, actively participated in the preparation of the prospectus
but had no part in the negotiations with Victor Billiard," while the
two remaining insiders, Vitolo and Pugliese, took no active part in
either the drafting of the prospectus or its presentation to the plaintiffs
and, at best, only suspected that the prospectus was misleading.

6

Coleman, a director by virtue of his position with Drexel and
Company and the one outside director named as a defendant in

Lanza, had been held liable in BarChris only because he failed to
make a sufficiently thorough investigation of the accuracy of the

7
prospectus to meet the requirements of section I1 of the 1933 Act.
There was no evidence that he suspected that the prospectus was false.
63. A sixth director, an attorney for the lead underwriter, who was not on the board when
the misleading registration statement was filed, and was thus neither a signer for section I I
purposes nor a maker of an untrue statement for rule lOb-5 purposes, was charged in Lanza with
conspiracy to continue a pattern of deception and concealment. He was absolved of liability.
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,826, at 90,100-01.
64. See id. at 90,094, 90,103.
65. Id. at 90,103. When the extent of his role in the activities which became the cause of
action in the BarChriscase is considered, see 283 F. Supp. 643, 653, 661, 671, 676, 677 (1968),
Russo's relative non-involvement in the negotiations with Victor Billiard Company hardly
seems surprising.
66. In BarChristhe court had found that even though they may not have read it, neither
Vitolo nor Pugliese could have believed that the registration statement was wholly true. 283 F.
Supp. at 684-85. This finding was not crucial to the court's holding in BarChris, however,
inasmuch as the court goes on to say that "in any case, there is nothing to show that they made
any investigation of anything which they may not have known about or, understood." Id. at
685. In Lanza, on the other hand, while the court found that there were false statements of which
Vitolo was aware, see CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,826, at 90,102, it found that Pugliese did
not have any suspicion that the prospectus was partly false or misleading. Id. at 90,103. There
was no evidence in either BarChrisor Lanza that either Vitolo or Pugliese took any active part
in the actual deception of the plaintiffs in either case, and in Lanza the court seemed to
equivocate on whether Vitolo knew that the prospectus was being used in the negotiations with
Victor Billiard. See text accompanying notes 88-91 infra.
67. 283 F. Supp. at 692-97. This is not to say that Coleman made no investigation at all. To
the contrary, both he and Drexel's attorney made general investigations of the corporation prior
to agreeing to underwrite the offering. They even directed specific inquiries to the inside directors
about various parts of the registration statement. But they did not make an independent
investigation of the accuracy of the answers they received. These inquiries were not sufficient for
section 11 purposes, according to the court in BarChrIs.Id.
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Nor was there any evidence beyond the bare misstatements themselves
that the other defendants were pursuing a common plan to defraud.
The fact situation in Lanza is thus similar to that in Fischman in
the sense that a misleading prospectus was used in the sale of securities
other than those described in the prospectus;6 8 but Lanza is,
nevertheless, distinguishable from Fischman. Fischman not only predated the line of rule lb-5 cases dispensing with the element of
scienter69 but also dealt only with allegations of a specific intent to
defraud. The court in Lanza, on the other hand, aware of both the
newer line of lOb-5 cases and the newly delineated duty of diligence
under section 11 of the 1933 Act, was faced with at least one
defendant who was found not to have known either of the falsity of the
prospectus which he signed or of its deceptive use, but who would have
known at least of its falsity had he conducted the investigation
required by section 11 .7 Moreover, the "scienter" of those defendants
in Lanza who clearly did have knowledge of some sort, ranged from
knowing use of a misleading prospectus, 7' through knowing
preparation of misleading statements in a prospectus,7 2 to mere
suspicion of the falsity of a prospectus which one has signed.7" The
court in Lanza was thus faced with two questions which the court in
Fischman did not confront: namely, whether, absent a showing of
scienter, liability could be imposed under rule lOb-5 on one who
signed a prospectus without making a reasonable investigation of its
contents; and whether, assuming that scienter was a required element
of proof in a rule lOb-5 action, mere suspicion of the falsity of a
prospectus, without any involvement in a common plan to defraud, or
even any involvement in the preparation of the prospectus, is a
sufficient showing of scienter to impose rule 1Ob-5 liability on a signer
of the prospectus.74
68. See notes 37-38 supraand accompanying text.
69. Indeed, Fischman is considered the originator of the view that scienter is a required
element in a rule lob-5 action. See note 12 supra.
70. Coleman and, according to the Lanza court at least, Pugliese could be so described. But
see note 66 supra.

71. See text accompanying note 64 supra and accompanying notes 81-83 infra describing
Kircher's role in the deception.
72. See text accompanying note 65 supra and accompanying notes 84-85 infra describing
Russo's role in the deception.

73. Vitolo, and according to the findings in BarChris,Pugliese had such suspicions. But see
note 66 supra.

74. For a general discussion of the meaning of "scienter" and the related term "fraud," see
note 12supra.
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The court in Lanza found Kircher, Russo, and Vitolo to be liable
under rule l0b-5, but absolved Pugliese and Coleman of liability. 75 In
so doing, however, the court attempted to avoid having to choose
between the line of cases holding that scienter is a required element of
a rule lOb-5 action 76 and the line of cases dispensing with it. The
court did so by finding that the defendants who were held liable had
sufficient scienter to justify liability under the line of cases which
required it, while finding that none of the defendants absolved of
liability were sufficiently negligent to justify liability even under the
line of cases dispensing with scienter. In its pre-occupation with
avoiding the controversy regarding the requirement of scienter, the
court never bothered to spell out what constitutes "scienter" when the
defendant possibly knew of the falsity of a statement in a corporate
78
document without knowing of the particular deception carried out.
Nor did the court spell out the nature of the duty imposed by rule lOb5, except to say that the section 11 standard of diligence is not
incorporated in the rule.79 Thus, the questions raised by the factual
situation in Lanza0 are not explicitly answered in that court's
opinion. The answering of these questions requires careful
examination of the Lanza court's specific findings with respect to
each individual defendant.
The court itself observed that there were "gradations" 81 of
culpability among those held liable. Kircher, described as a "highly
intelligent and learned accountant," was said to know better than
anyone that the prospectus was misleading.82 Because, as the chief
negotiator for BarChris in the Victor Billiard transaction, he had
personally given a copy of the prospectus to Victor Billiard's
negotiator, he had clearly' used the prospectus as a deceptive device in
connection with the purchase and sale of securities and thereby met
92,826, at 90,107.
75. CCH FED. Sc. L. REp.
76. See note I I supra.
77. See note 15 supra.
78. This is more than a distinction between "knowledge of falsity" and "intent to deceive."
See note 12 supra.The concern is rather with the distinction between making a false statement in
writing (or knowing that a statement in writing is false) and knowing that the false statement is
being used deceptively by another. This was arguably the case with Vitolo. See text
accompanying notes 88-91 infra.
79. CCH FED. Sac. L. REp. 1 92,826, at 90,015, quoted in text accompanying note 1It
infra.
80. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
92,826, at 90,103.
81. CCH FED. Sac. L. REP.
82. Id.
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the "use" requirement of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 discussed
earlier."'
Russo personally prepared a grossly misleading backlog figure
appearing in the prosectus, and the court found that if he "did not in
fact know that the figure was overstated, he was so reckless in its
preparation that his lOb-5 liability cannot be questioned."' Yet the
court did not find that Russo participated in, or even knew of,
Kircher's deceptive employment of the prospectus in the negotiations
with Victor Billiard.8s Taking the court's findings at face value, one
might conclude that Russo's liability was based solely on his reckless
preparation of the backlog figure and that a showing of one's
participation in, or knowledge of, the deceptive employment of the
prospectus is therefore not necessary under rule lOb-5. But this
interpretation is unacceptable, not only because it is analytically
unsound,"8 but also because it ignores the limiting language of the
statute pursuant to which rule lOb-5 was promulgated."1 Two further
interpretations of the imposition of liability in Russo's case are
possible, however, if one goes beyond the explicit language of the
Lanza opinion. The imposition of liability might be said to imply a
finding that, because of Russo's position of responsibility in the
corporation and his active participation in the preparation of the
83. See notes 51-55 supraand accompanying text.
84. CCH FED. Sec. L. REP.
92,826, at 90,103.
85. See note 65 supraand accompanying text.
86. Under rule lOb-5 it is unlawful to make untrue statements "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of a security. See text of rule lob-5 in note 2 supra. There is, of course, no
requirement of privity under the rule. See note 38 supra. Moreover, in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), an injunctive proceeding involving a public release
which omitted pertinent information of interest to the investing public, the court gave a broad
interpretation of the phrase "in connection with," holding that in equitable proceedings, at
least, rule lOb-5 is violated "whenever assertions are made . . . in a manner reasonably
calculated to influence the investing public. . . if such assertions are false or misleading or are
so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of whether the issuance of the release was motivated by
corporate officials for ulterior purposes.' Id. at 862. But as this language itself suggests, the
court's conclusion was premised on its earlier holding in the same case that in an equitable
proceeding it is only necessary to show defendant's lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or
unreasonable or negligent conduct. See note 17 supra. If the Lanza court is to be taken at its
word that the liability of the defendants in Lanza is based solely on intentional or reckless
conduct, see text following note 77 supra, then the court must at least find that Russo knew of or
recklessly disregarded the deceptive use of the prospectus as well as having recklessly prepared
the figures in the prospectus. Otherwise his liability as a drafter would be based on conduct more
negligent than knowing.
87. As was indicated in the text accompanying notes 51-55 supra, section 10(b) seems to
require that one participate in the employment of the device.
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prospectus, he must have either recklessly.ignored, or had actual
knowledge of Kircher's utilization of the prospectus in the
negotiations with plaintiff. Equally possible, however, is the
implication that Russo was held by the court to have had a duty to
guard against Kircher's utilization of the prospectus, quite apart from
what he might actually have known. The court's silence as to which
route it traveled in linking Russo to the deceptive use of the
misleading prospectus seems to suggest that the court did not consider
the matter but would be willing to arrive at liability by either route.
That impression is buttressed by the fact that the same ambiguity
occurs in the court's findings as to Vitolo, whose actual knowledge
was even less apparent from the evidence.
The court suggests that despite his limited education and his nonparticipation in the drafting or deceptive employment of the
prospectus, Vitolo, as president of BarChris, "owed duties of
diligence . . .to make sure that all official documents of the
corporation were accurate ..".8.8I Vitolo's liability is not based
merely on a lack of diligence, however, since, "[g]iven the extent and
character of what he knew, [Vitolo] is found to have been a knowing
party to the deception of the plaintiffs." ' Yet the court's description
of the extent of Vitolo's knowledge includes only his knowledge of
false statements in the prospectus. As to Vitolo's link with Kircher's
deceptive use of the prospectus, the court simply remarks, apparently
responding to a defense of ignorance raised by Vitolo, that he "cannot
be heard to say that he did not know that plaintiffs had received these
documents; . . . he knew that, at a time when these were the most
current documents showing the financial situation of the corporation,
BarChris' representatives were negotiating with the plaintiffs
. -'"90 Here, as with Russo, the court's remark could be construed
either as a finding of fact that Vitolo must have had actual knowledge
of the deceptive use of the prospectus" or as a conclusion of law that
Vitolo owed plaintiffs a duty of diligence.
Despite the court's failure to explain fully the basis of the liability
of either Russo or Vitolo, it seems that the court reached the correct
result with respect to both of these directors. Even if scienter is
92,826, at 90,102.
88. CCH FED. SEc. L. RP.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Later language in the Lanza opinion indicates Vitolo may not have known of Kircher's
ise of the prospectus in the negotiations. See note 94 infra.
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assumed to be a necessary element, and Vitolo and Russo are assumed
not to have known that Kircher used the prospectus in the
negotiations, each was a controlling person responsible for Kircher's
actions. 92 Regardless whether Russo could be said to have acted in
good faith with respect to Victor Billiard Company, 93 he had
indirectly induced the act violating rule l0b-5 by preparing the
misleading backlog figure. Likewise, regardless whether Vitolo could
be said to have induced the use of the prospectus, his claim of good
faith was insufficient since he allowed Kircher, whom he knew to be
responsible for many of the misleading statements in the prospectus,
to negotiate for BarChris.14 Indeed, the finding that Vitolo and Russo
were liable due to their control of a violator of rule lOb-5 explains why
the discussion of their own rule l0b-5 liability is so truncated. The
crucial determinant of Russo's and Vitolo's liability, whether based
on rule lOb-5 or section 20 of the 1934 Act, seems to have been their
status as inside directors in the corporation. The court apparently felt
that either an actual knowledge of, a duty to be familiar with, or a
high degree of control over misstatements made in a prospectus or in
personal negotiations9 s could be inferred from one's very status as an
insider and that any one of these inferences was a sufficient basis for
liability. Since all three inferences could legitimately be drawn with
respect to Russo and Vitolo, the court's failure to state which
inference it would adjudge the most compelling is of little significance.
The important question is whether these inferences are always to be
92. CCH FED. Sac. L. REp.

92,826, at 90,103.

93. Under section 20 one must have acted in good faith and not have induced, directly or
indirectly, any acts constituting a cause of action under the rule. See notes 56-59 supra and
accompanying text. Knowingly drafting a misleading prospectus would be an indirect
inducement of its deceptive use, whether or not one could be said to have acted in good faith with
respect to the particular person deceived.
94. CCH FED. SEc. L. REp. V 92,826, at 90,103. It is significant that Vitolo's lack of good
faith as a controlling person is based on what he is said to have known of Kircher and the
prospectus, rather than what he is said to have known of the actual conduct of the negotiations.
The court conspicuously avoids finding that Vitolo knew the plaintiffs had received a copy of the
misleading prospectus, when such a finding would be quite appropriate.
95. Similarly, Folk says of inside directors defending in a section I1 action:
.. . the scope and depth of their knowledge ofinternal corporate affairs, orat least their
continuing access to information, heighten their responsibilities [so that] in some
instances, as in BarChris.no amount of investigation would afford protection or
establish a "reasonable ground for belief" in a registration statement which in fact is
false and misleading.
Folk, Part173. That an insider's knowledge is a rebuttable presumption under either section 11
or rule 10b-5 is suggested in note 101 infra and accompanying text.
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drawn in the case of an inside director and whether they are also to be
drawn in the case of an outside director. The court implicitly speaks to
each of these questions in giving its reasons for absolving Pugliese and
Coleman of liability.
Of Pugliese, the court said that despite his title as vice-president,
he was "genuinely ignorant of most of the things that concern us and
unequipped by education or experience to understand them.""6 His
duties in the corporation, moreover, were said to be limited to the
supervision of construction." The court found that if Pugliese read the
registration statement at all, he did not understand it or suspect that it
was misleading. 8 His liability, therefore, could not be predicated on
scienter. Nevertheless, the court went on to consider whether Pugliese
could be held liable on some other ground. It concluded, however,
that there must be at least a showing of a lack of due diligence,
constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct, 9 and that
there was no basis for so characterizing Pugliese's conduct. Similarly,
Pugliese was found not to be liable as a controlling person because he
"did nothing to induce any of the acts of the negotiators or of the
draftsmen of the documents supplied to the plaintiffs. . . [and] acted
in good faith at all times."'0
Thus, one's status as an insider, by itself, apparently will not
support the inference that one must have known or that one had a
duty to determine the accuracy of a prospectus which one signed or
the uses to which the prospectus was being put, if one's capacity to
understand the prospectus and one's responsibilities in the
corporation are sufficiently limited. In these circumstances there must
be an actual showing of the particular insider's negligence or lack of
due diligence.101 While the court does not say what would be a
96. CCH FED. SEc. L. REp.

1 92,826, at 90,103.

97. Id. at 90,104.
98. Id. at 90,103.

99. The Lanza court relied on SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir.
1968), for this language. For the significance ofthat reliance, see note 17 supra.
100. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,826, at 90,104. The court did raise the question of
whether "mere formal control" would be sufficient under section 20 of the 1934 Act. CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. $ 92,826, at 90,104 n.17. But it noted approvingly that at least one court had
assumed that a director is by definition a controlling person. Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F.
Supp. 439,447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), affdper curain.422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970), although it was
unnecessary to decide the question in Lanza since, even assuming Pugliese was a controlling
person, he was found to be free of liability.
101. Similarly, Folk says that in BarChris:
It is implied that the scope of an individual inside director's duties may be relevant to a
court's refusing to find that it would be impossible . . . for him to have reasonable
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sufficient ground for characterizing Pugliese's conduct as negligent or
lacking in diligence, it is clear from the court's finding of nonliability, that merely signing a prospectus without making the
reasonable investigation required by section 11 is not sufficient in
itself. If rule 10b-5 imposes any duty to know of the accuracy of a
prospectus one has signed, it is apparently imposed only on those
signers who are either in a corporate position responsible for the
supervision of, or are actually engaged in the preparation or deceptive
use of the prospectus. The particular duty imposed on this class of
signers, moreover, appears to depend on whether the duty arises from
what one was inferred to know or from what one was said to be
responsible for knowing. If actual knowledge or reckless disregard of
the inaccuracies in a prospectus can be inferred, then the signer could
be said to owe a duty of diligence to prevent the deceptive employment
of the prospectus, 0 2 even if he has played no part in its preparation or
employment.10 Conversely, it would seem to follow that if a signer
takes a direct hand in the preparation or employment of the
prospectus or is in a position to supervise same, then he is under a
duty to determine its accuracy, whether or not he knew the prospectus
to be false."'
That this characterization of the duty of diligence imposed by rule
10b-5 is indeed what the Lanza court intended, and that it
consequently limits the liability of outside directors in much the same
way that it limits the liability of insiders with limited responsibilities
in the corporation, is indicated by the court's finding with respect to
Coleman, the other defendant absolved of liability. The plaintiffs'
grounds for belief and actual belief in the accuracy of the prospectus. Thus, an individual
with a narrow compass of duties or less chance to know the corporate affairs would
probably be protected if he made a reasonable investigation but failed to turn up some

misstatements. . . . These are fine distinctions, however, and a heavy burden still
remains on the defendant to dispel a natural inference of probable knowledge.
Folk, Part123. Pugliese was found liable in BarChrisbecause he made no investigation at all.

See note 66 supra.Thus, he could only have been relieved of liability in Lanza because, due to his
lack of actual knowledge of, or participatin in the deception practiced on the plaintiffs, he was
under no duty of diligence. It cannot be said that he had met his rule lOb-5 duty of diligence
because he had done nothing.
102. Russo and Vitolo could be said to have owed this duty. See text accompanying note 91
supra.
103. Vitolo's case could be so described. See text accompanying note 88 supra.

104. This case was not presented in Lanza but the result can be inferred from the court's
findings with respect to Coleman. See text accompanying note 105 infra.Just as a duty to advise

follows from one's knowledge of the falsity of the prospectus, so a duty to investigate follows
from one'sparticipationin the negotiations.
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case against Coleman was found to be insufficient because, as a
matter of fact, Coleman neither participatedin nor knew of any of the
deception practiced upon the plaintiffs and because, as a matter of
law, he was under no duty in those circumstances to investigate more
than he did or to advise the plaintiffs in any way.0 5 In arriving at its
conclusion of law, moreover, the court placed great reliance not only
on its findings as to Coleman's non-complicity in the deception but
also on his status as an outsider." 6 As an outsider, the court reasoned,
Coleman was neither required nor even permitted to intrude on the
negotiations with the plaintiffs. 107 Nor was he liable as a controlling
person, since, like Pugliese, he acted in good faith and did nothing to
induce the acts of the draftsmen or of the negotiators. 0
Thus, in the absence of a showing of actual participation in the
drafting or use of a misleading prospectus or of actual knowledge of
its falsity, an outside director is apparently not liable under rule 1Ob-5
for failing to make a reasonable investigation of the sort required by
section 11. The primary difficulty with the court's opinion in Lanza,
however, surfaces in its attempt to explain this result.
Coleman was said to have satisfied "whatever duty of due
diligence there is under Rule 10b-5"'19 by his personal inquiries to
responsible parties within the corporation, even though these same
inquiries were not satisfactory for purposes of section II of the 1933
Act."0 The court distinguished the two provisions by saying that the
high standard of diligence of section 11 "is not incorporated in Rule
lOb-5, which applies to all corporate documents and releases, not just
to registration statements or prospectuses.""' Yet, contrary to the
suggestion that some investigation is required under rule lOb-5, the
Lanza court absolved Pugliese of liability even though his section I I
liability in BarChris had been predicated on a complete failure to
make any inquiries regarding the prospectus.1 2 Further, contrary to
the suggestion that the standard of diligence under rule lOb-5 is not so
high as under section 11, the Lanza court would apparently have been
105. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. T 92,826, at 90,104. See note 104 supra and accompanying
text.
106. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.

107.
108.
109.
110.

92,826, at 90,104,90,105 n.18.

Id. at 90,104-05.
Id. at 90,105-06.
Id. at 90,105.
For the extent of Coleman's inquiries, see note 67 supra.

111. CCH FED. SEC. L. Rap.
112. See note 101 supra.

92,826, at 90,105.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1971:559

willing to hold Vitolo to a duty of diligence under rule lOb-5 which
was scarcely less strict than his duty of diligence under section I1 had3
it not been able to infer that he knew the prospectus was misleading.1
A more satisfactory explanation of Coleman's non-liability would be
that because he did not know of, and was not in fact involved in any
way with, the deception of the plaintiffs and because, as an outside
director, he had no responsibility for the negotiations with the
plaintiffs, Coleman simply did not owe a rule lOb-5 duty of diligence
to the plaintiffs."' This would be true even though, as a director and
as one who signed the misleading prospectus, Coleman owed such a
duty of diligence under section 11 to purchasers of the security
described in the prospectus. In short, it is not the standard of diligence
but the particularconduct proscribed that distinguishes rule lOb-5
liability for a misleading prospectus from that imposed by section 11
of the 1933 Act. Section 11 proscribes the mere act of signing a
misleading prospectus, liability for which can only be avoided by
making a reasonable investigation of the accuracy of the prospectus
prior to signing. Rule lOb-5, on the other hand, imposes liability for
the act of making a misleading statement in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. "5 Whether the act of signing a
misleading prospectus also constitutes "making a misleading
statement in connection with the purchase or sale of a security"
depends on the signer' knowing or negligent participation in, or
supervisory responsibility over, the preparation or employment of the
misleading prospectus. If one of these elements is present, the signer
may well have as strict a duty of diligence under rule lOb-5 as he has
under section 11.
113. See text accompanying note 88 supra.

114. This is the only conclusion which could be drawn with respect to Pugliese. See note 101
supra.
115. Significantly, section 12(2) imposes liability for conduct described in much the same
way, see note 6 supra,though subject, of course, to a privity requirement which is not present in
either a section 11 or a rule lOb-5 action. See notes 27 & 38 supra.

